Abstract-Managing a heterogeneous "outer edge" network is complex and error prone. It is typically performed by non technical users. Effective HAN configuration may be hampered by a poor understanding of HAN service requirements. A challenge is to deploy and maintain meaningful and error-free heterogeneous HAN configurations. This paper explores an integrated solution to address the following requirements: managed capability sharing, usability, and security. A prototype HAN gateway architecture that builds upon explicit user-centric semantics, and enables autonomic management of shared UPnP services with appropriate access controls, is outlined.
INTRODUCTION
An emerging characteristic of communications networks is the growing complexity and heterogeneity of the "outer edge" -the point of attachment of Home Area Networks (HANs) and other restricted private networks to commercial access networks [1] . Today, managing of the components of these networks (e.g. home gateways) is a piecemeal process, with different devices having a wide range of management functionalities, from none to proprietary or conforming to one of a range of competing standards. Furthermore, management operations must be performed by end-users, so there is huge potential for mis-configurations that can significantly impact the delivery of services on an end-to-end basis with consequent operational and support costs for service providers [2] . [4] . In this paper we discuss how that work has been extended with semantic descriptions of shared capabilities and autonomic access controls that build on both these semantic service descriptions and a security knowledge base. We present a revised gateway architecture based on [2] that links these components together.
In this paper. section 2 discusses system requirements, section 3 provides an overview of existing solutions for HAN capability sharing, section 4 escribes our approach. Finally section 5 describes our conclusions and plans for future work.
II.

REQUIREMENTS
A.
Capability/Management Capability Sharing
We define a capability as an abstraction of one or more useful aspects of one or more resources or services.
Capabilities can be local or remote and must be actively shared to grant remote access. Federation is defined as a "persistent organisational agreement which enables multiple autonomous entities to share capabilities in a controlled way" [2] . There are multiple, overlapping reasons for network and service providers to engage in capability sharing in the context of the HAN environment, e.g. access to multiple service providers.
B.
Usability (Managability)
The shift in value towards products' ability to be used with the rest of the digital ecosystem means that consumers must be able to manage multi-device, multi-user, multi-network deployments, which was once only the remit of traditional operator's network control centers. There are several sources of system complexity that must be tamed to create usable federated HANs. Self-configuring autonomic systems is one approach to increasing usability [5] , policy-based management has been shown to be an intuitive governance model [6] .
C. Security
While HAN services may provide their own security (e.g. access control), it is best practice to rely on multiple layers of security, for example the deployment of firewalls [7] . A critical feature of most prior attempts at federation has been the assumption or imposition of a single, unified management model of the network and services with the consequent constraint on the supported business models. We contend that rather than imposing shared models, that management model heterogeneity is an axiomatic property of any realistic ecosystem supporting dynamic federation formation.
Semantic web technology for OAM is not new, see [10] for a recent survey. However new aspects of our approach are the emphasis on RDF rather than OWL, the lack of unified, complete knowledge models of the network(s), the central role
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of dynamic semantic interoperability and the combination of FRM-style organization-centric policy (rules) with semantics.
IV. OUR ApPROACH
In the following sub-sections we describe our HAN 
B. XMPP-based UPnP Capability Sharing
In order to enable secure and simple sharing of UPnP devices [3] ). Each device or service then acts as a flexible capability definition, and is supported by a managed sharing infrastructure.
C. Semantic Capability Graphs
Our Federal Relationship Manager (FRM) [4] provides a means to manage capability sharing, e.g. through establishing a shared semantics, secure capability delegation, and so on. A key feature of the system is the distribution of self-describing capability authorities across federated domains. Here we present the modeling approach employed to define a semantic capability graph to support shared capability models.
1)
Capability Authorities: Shared capabilities must map onto local resources or services in a consistent way and there must be a mechanism to verify which local resources have been shared and to whom. Capability sharing is enabled by delegation of Capability Authorities (CAs) between federated domains. A CA is both a well defined capability and an associated set of permissions and non-functional restrictions.
Any party that wishes to make capabilities available to third parties must construct a CA model to express how the offered capabilities are bundled into CAs. This model is instantiated as a service that compares two CAs and answers the question as to whether one encapsulates the other according to the model. This allows CAs that represent arbitrary aggregations of specific permissions to be distributed between federal participants. Whenever a third-party wishes to invoke a capability of a federal partner, the federal partner merely needs to establish whether the capability being invoked is encapsulated by a CA that has been securely issued to that third party. CAs are abstractions that may map to specific resources, services or functions, but they may also map to sets of services with restrictions on parameters. So, for example, a CA named AccessMediaStreamer may map directly to a service of the same name, or it may map to a set of services (e.g.
GetMediaInfo, SetPlayMode, ... ). By extension, the CA AccessLoungeMediaStreamer may map to these same services with their parameters restricted to only allow the services to be 648 invoked on a specific device. CA models thus serve to aggregate resources and services into bundles for distribution and are abstracted away from the underlying implementations.
2) RDF-based Capability Models: Secure delegation of CAs provides a flexible and expressive means of performing capability sharing. There are already a wide variety of RDF based formats for describing service invocation, e.g. see [12] , thus, we remain agnostic to semantic service description languages and adopt the simple assumption that the various services that constitute our capabilities may be described by arbitrary sets of RDF triples. This parallels the approach of the Linked Data community to encourage the publication of structured information that is interlinked into a wider web of data to give it context and the ability to leverage other information sources. The objective of structured capability description is to hold sufficient information to assist human intervention in interworking since completely automated approaches to interoperability is unlikely [13] . 
D. Autonomic Access Control Configuration
To simplify this complex area a framework is required to represent and reason about the knowledge associated with HANAC security configuration. We take an ontology engineering approach to modeling HANAC security configuration knowledge [15] , previous work focused on NAC control configuration for iptables, e.g. [14] , and TCP-Wrapper.
We propose a threat-based approach to structure the access control configuration knowledge. Semantic Threat Graphs [15] , a variation of the traditional threat tree, are encoded within the
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have investigated the approach of defining new looser, semantic models of HAN capabilities and threat-graph based models for automatically generating access control rules on both those capabilities and any HANAC-defined network resource. These ideas have been tested by describing the specific capabilities flexibly shared by our UPnP over XMPP system and deploying them for an access control scenario. We have also outlined the approach to leverage capability models, threat modes and known best practices in HANAC configurations to automatically generate policy rules to best protect a HAN with minimum security expertise required on behalf of the user. Future evaluations will establish the extent to which semantic capability graphs enable semantic interoperability of service definitions and the relative costs of providing policy-based access controls at different levels of granularity.
